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On Making Experimental Design Choices: Discussions on the use and challenges of 
demand effects, incentives, deception, samples, and vignettes 
Abstract 
 
In late 2018, the Journal of Operations Management published an invited methods article by 
Lonati et al. (2018) to provide guidance to authors on how to design behavioral experiments to 
achieve the rigor required for consideration in the journal. That article was written as a response 
to a number of behavioral research submissions to JOM, each dealing with interesting topics but 
viewed by the editors to possess poor design choices at inception. While the Lonati et al. (2018) 
piece provides experimental guidance fitting to certain research agendas, questions have arisen 
concerning whether and how exactly to implement some of the points that it makes, and how to 
best address trade-offs in the design of behavioral experiments. Questions have also arisen 
concerning how to apply these concepts in operations management (OM) research. This technical 
note seeks to address these questions, by diving into the details of research risks and trade-offs 
regarding demand effects, incentives, deception, sample selection, and context-rich vignettes. The 
authors would like to recognize the input of a large number of senior scholars in the JOM 
community who have provided support and feedback as we have sought to help authors tease out 
what can reasonably be done in designing strong behavioral experiments that fit various research 
agendas. 
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Behavioral research in the Journal of Operations Management (JOM) and the Operations 
Management (OM) field draws from a wide variety of disciplines and methodological approaches. 
As the scope of the field broadens (Croson, Schultz, Siemsen, & Yeo, 2013), it requires researchers 
to be more knowledgeable in multiple reference disciplines (Bendoly, Croson, Goncalves, & 
Schultz, 2010). The benefits in expanding OM’s foundational focus are, of course, numerous; 
foremost is that this allows researchers to ask interesting research questions and apply the most 
appropriate methodologies for a specific research question. Yet, the combination of such diverse 
methodologies also requires trade-offs in research design, and can be challenging for authors and 
reviewers trying to successfully navigate such a wide range of methods using the highest standards.  
The recent invited article by Lonati, Quiroga, Zehnder, and Antonakis (2018) presents “the 
‘ten commandments’ of experimental research” (p. 20) with the end goal of providing “a synthesis 
of best practices into a uniform methodological paradigm that can help guide future experimental 
work” (p. 20). These authors raise critical concerns about many of the challenges associated with 
experimental work, identifying several pitfalls that should be avoided. However, given the way 
their recommendations are presented in the article (particularly Table 1), there is a risk of OM 
researchers potentially overlooking the nuance implicit to their methodological recommendations 
and interpreting them as more restrictive than perhaps intended. While Lonati et al. (2018) 
acknowledge some of these nuances, and provide reasons to employ different experimental design 
choices beyond exclusive adherence to the “ten commandments”, there is a need to further flesh 
out guidance and compensate for misunderstandings that have been observed by many experienced 
authors in the JOM community. In this technical note, we therefore extend the discussion started 




carefully navigate research design choices. The primary design decisions that have raised questions 
in the OM community concern demand effects, incentive alignment, deception, sample issues, and 
context-rich vignette experiments. 
In this note, we provide a roadmap, departing from the Lonati et al. (2018) discussion, that 
guides OM researchers as they explore a breadth of important research questions, rigorously 
drawing from a variety of theoretical foundations (Cook, Campbell, & Shadish, 2002; Campbell 
& Stanley, 2015). We explore trade-offs arising in designing and administering experimental 
research in OM (McGrath, 1982; Scandura & Williams, 2000; Bickman & Rog, 2008). 
Consideration of trade-offs does not imply a lack of standards or rigor; rather it enforces 
explicitness relating to potentially incompatible goals, the “strengths and weaknesses of alternative 
means for pursuing goals”, and justification of research design choices (Collier, Brady, & 
Seawright, 2004, p. 223). We provide insights regarding these experimental trade-offs in 
consideration of evidence in Section 2. In Section 3, we consider the interdependence of these 
design decisions, and provide examples of how these trade-offs may be made across the entire 
array of design decisions with published papers from the OM field. 
2. Considerations of different research design choices that maximize rigor  
All research methods have limitations, and as such no one method is the “best” or “correct” 
or “true” method (McGrath, 1982). Trade-offs are necessary in all experimental work. In this 
section, we develop the discussion around five issues raised by Lonati et al. (2018), exploring the 
nuances that are likely to arise in the OM context when designing and administering experiments: 
demand effects, incentive alignment, deception, sample issues, and context-rich vignette 









Greater concern when: 
• The research question involves a 
sensitive topic (e.g., ethical behavior) 
where participants might guess what the 
researcher wants. 
• The manipulations are salient to 
participants. 
• Participants and researchers interact 
directly. 
Lesser concern when: 
• Using a between-subjects design 
(participants do not see more than 
treatment). 
• The research question is not obvious to 
participants. 
• Participants are unlikely to guess the 
research hypotheses. 
• The experiment is double-blinded. 
Suggestions for OM experimental research: 
• Test for demand effects if it pertains to the 
research question or context.  
• Use a pilot study to test manipulation 
effectiveness. 
• Use between-subject designs for research where 
demand effects are viewed as a concern, or 
appropriate mitigation measures for within-
subject designs. 
Incentives 
Financial incentives beneficial when: 
• The research question and desired 
behaviors are related to economic 
motivations and incentives. 
• The external research context being 
studied has similar incentives. 
• Behaviors can be connected to decision-
based incentives in meaningful ways. 
Financial incentives problematic when: 
• Decision-based incentives would bias 
respondents, increase demand effect risks, 
or reduce external validity. 
• The behaviors in the experiment are not 
well-defined choices between different 
economic outcomes or are otherwise 
unrelated to economic choices. 
• The experiment involves deception or 
withholding of information that could be 
perceived as influencing compensation. 
Suggestions for OM experimental research: 
• Make the experiment as close as possible to the 
research context being analyzed such as 
rewarding respondents like real-world reward 
scenarios. 
• Use decision-based incentives when they are 
connected to the research question. 
• Carefully consider the research question and the 
behaviors being observed to decide between 
decision-based incentives or general incentives. 
Deception 
Deception may be warranted when ALL of 
the following apply: 
• Deception is necessary to answer the 
research question 
• The benefits outweigh the potential 
harms.  
• Respondents are fully debriefed and 
participant harm is minimized.  
• The research complies with IRB or 
appropriate ethical guidelines regarding 
the use of deception.  
Avoid deception when: 
• Non-deceptive alternatives could be used 
instead of deception. 
• The potential harms outweigh the benefits. 
• The sample population is frequently used 
for experiments such as a laboratory. 
• The deception would influence or could be 
perceived as influencing respondent 
compensation. 
Suggestions for OM experimental research: 
• Use deception only when necessary for the 
research question and the benefits outweigh the 
potential harm. 
• Consider respondent harm, sampling norms of 
laboratories, available alternatives, and the fit 
between the research question and experimental 
design before using deception.  
• Be transparent about the usage of deception, and 
follow IRB guidelines (in the U.S.) and 









General samples allowable when: 
• The research question emphasizes 
individual behaviors that are generalizable 
to many contexts. 
• The experiment context does not require in-
depth knowledge of any particular context.  
Targeted samples preferred when: 
• The research question is dependent on context. 
• The level of analysis is at a higher level such 
as organizational or interfirm contexts. 
• The samples should have adequate experience 
to fully understand the context.  
Suggestions for OM experimental research: 
• Match the unit of analysis and context to the 
sample population.  
• More general sampling approaches such as student 
populations or general online sampling methods are 
appropriate when the behavior in the research 
question is universal and generalizable to many 
contexts. 
• Use more specific sampling approaches when the 
context of the experiment is important and when 
the behaviors observed are meant to be 
generalizable to more specific samples.   
• Use multiple sample populations when possible. 
Vignettes 
 
Vignettes more appropriate when: 
• The context of the experiment is necessary 
for the research question. 
• The topic is sensitive. 
• Manipulations on different scenarios are 
realistic and respondents and researchers are 
blind to the manipulations. 
• Respondents would have an appropriate 
grasp of the experimental context. 
Vignettes less appropriate when: 
• The manipulation lacks meaningful realism to 
the participants.  
• Participants lack context to make informed and 
realistic decisions. 
• Determining effect sizes. 
 
Suggestions for OM experimental research: 
• Match the research design to the research question 
and embrace the appropriate epistemological 
foundation for the research question.  
• Be transparent in the type of research and the 
foundations used in the research.  
• When using manipulations in all experimental 
designs, make such interventions as consequential 




2.1. What are the risks of experimental demand effects and how should they be addressed? 
 
 One of the many criticisms levied against experimental research involving human subjects 
concerns the threat of experimental demand effects (also referred to as demand characteristics). 
These effects represent “changes in behavior by experimental subjects due to cues about what 
constitutes appropriate behavior (behavior ‘demanded’ from them)” (Zizzo, 2010, p. 75). For 
demand effects to pose a risk to experimental research, participants need to change their behavior 
based on their belief of the researcher’s desired outcomes, and this change needs to be correlated 
with the objectives of the research (see Zizzo, 2010). Lonati et al. (2018) address demand effects 
in their third “commandment”, focusing on describing situations where demand effects pose a  
particularly strong risk. We elaborate on the perceived risks of demand effects and provide several 
ways to proactively address and test for them.  
 Several recent substantive empirical investigations provide guidance regarding the risk of 
demand effects. De Quidt, Haushofer, and Roth (2018) explore demand effects in economic games, 
and Mummolo and Peterson (2019) explore demand effects in vignette experiments. De Quidt et 
al. (2018) deliberately induced demand effects in opposite directions and measured changes in 
targeted behavior to measure their risk. Using approximately 19,000 participants across 11 
canonical economic games (e.g., the dictator game and trust game), they concluded the following 
(p. 3268, emphasis added):  
Our first finding is that responses to the weak treatments are modest, averaging 
around 0.13 standard deviations, varying from close to 0 for unincentivized real 
effort to 0.29 standard deviations for trust game second movers. In most tasks, our 
estimates are not significantly different from zero. Overall, we interpret these 
results as suggesting that demand effects in typical experiments are likely to be 
small. Responses to our strong demand treatments are much larger, with bounds 
averaging 0.6 standard deviations and ranging from 0.23 to 1.06 standard 
deviations. While these bounds are likely more conservative than required in most 




signals about the researcher’s objective, and thus researchers are right to pay close 
attention to potential demand effects in their studies. 
 
It is important to qualify the difference between these findings. The “weak” manipulation 
informs participants of the experimental hypothesis and the expected direction of their findings, 
with these instructions varying by treatment. As de Quidt et al. (2018) noted regarding the weak 
effect condition, “We believe that these treatments are likely to be more informative than implicit 
signals about demand in typical studies, so in our view these bounds will be sufficient for most 
applications” (p. 3267). The “strong” manipulation included asking participants to specifically 
answer questions in one way (“You will do us a favor if…”) and demonstrated that it is possible 
to create demand effects by asking participants to answer in that specific way. Overall, these results 
suggest that similar, well-designed experiments are likely not to be impacted by demand effects, 
but that participants will respond in certain ways if asked.  
Mummolo and Peterson (2019) investigated demand effects using five different 
hypothetical vignettes grounded in various political science contexts. The manipulations used in 
Mummolo and Peterson (2019) were highly similar to the “weak” manipulation of de Quidt et al. 
(2018), as they included only a hint regarding the research hypotheses in their instructions.1 
Mummolo and Peterson concluded that “across five surveys that involve more than 12,000 
respondents and over 28,000 responses to these experiments, we fail to find evidence for the 
existence of [experimental demand effects] EDEs in online survey experiments” (2019, p. 518). 
Similar to de Quidt et al. (2018), Mummolo and Peterson (2019) were able to create a demand 
 
1 For example, in the Partisan News Experiment, participants in the “weak” condition receive the following 
instructions: “You will now be asked to consider some hypothetical (not real) online news items and to indicate which 
news item you would most prefer to read. The purpose of this exercise is so we can measure whether the news outlet 
offering an article influences how likely people are to read the article.” In the “strong” (explicit) condition, the last 
sentence is modified to: “The purpose of this exercise is so we can measure whether people are more likely to choose 
a news item if it is offered by a news outlet with a reputation of being friendly toward their preferred political party.” 




effect in some extreme conditions, such as when respondents were given financial incentives to 
follow explicit demand effects: “When this added incentive is present, we are sometimes able to 
detect differences in observed treatment effects that are consistent with the presence of 
[experimental demand effects] EDEs. But on average, pooling across all our experiments, we still 
see no detectable differences in treatment effects even when financial incentives are offered” 
(2019, p. 518).  
Comparing findings across these studies, the evidence suggests demand effects were 
smaller in the vignette manipulations in Mummolo and Peterson (2019) than in the economic 
games in de Quidt et al. (2018), although for both groups the total impact was low. It is possible 
that the difference is due to the different demand effect manipulations between the two studies, the 
specific experiments selected, or the different contexts. For example, economic games tend to be 
more abstract in comparison to vignettes, which typically include a richer context (Camerer, 1997). 
When considering choices in an abstract thought experiment (i.e., the dictator game or trust game), 
it may be that participants are likely to rely more on situational cues (i.e., hints from the researcher) 
in selecting their behaviors, leading to heightened demand effects relative to vignette experiments 
where the contextual information provided is used to make behavioral decisions. Furthermore, 
although the vignettes studies in Mummolo and Peterson (2019) were conducted in political 
science, and not OM, their “inability to uncover evidence of hypothesis-confirming behavior 
across multiple samples, survey platforms, research questions and experimental designs suggests 
that longstanding concerns over demand effects in survey experiments may be largely 
exaggerated” (2019, p. 528). Some of the issues addressed in their vignettes in fact directly 
correlate to questions studied in an OM context, for example the implications of race on resumé 




drivers based on ethnicity (Ta, Esper, and Hofer, 2018). Moreover, some of the underlying theories 
explaining behavior in these studies, for example framing effects, are the same as those used in 
OM research (e.g., Abbey et al., 2019; Wuttke et al., 2018). Taken together, these results suggest 
that experimental research can be carried out in the OM context in a way that minimizes demand 
effects. Further research into the demand effects of strong manipulations is warranted. 
Although the empirical evidence that is available suggests that the risk posed by demand 
effects is expected to be limited in the OM context, it is worth considering, as Lonati et al. (2018) 
did, the kinds of strong manipulations that might occur in this context, and whether such strong 
manipulations would yield demand effects that would be sufficiently large to cause concern. Even 
in these cases, examples of remedies can be found from the literature. For example, Dhar, Jain, 
and Jayachandran (2018), concerned that socially desirable responses might interact with their 
treatment in a field experiment, incorporated a short-form Marlow-Crowne module to measure 
respondents’ propensity to offer socially desirable baselines.2 Similarly, researchers concerned 
about demand effects (for example, when the manipulations might be particularly salient to 
participants or the researcher interacts with the participants directly in some way) could benefit 
through direct measurement of potential demand effects, and correlating those biases to the 
treatments. De Quidt et al. (2018, p. 3288-3289) describe a within-subject approach that can be 
added at the end of a study to construct bounds for demand effects for each participant. Tsutsui 
and Zizzo (2014) measure respondents’ “[experimental demand effect] EDE Sensitivity,” and find 
evidence that this measure was “uncorrelated with behavior” in all regressions and robustness tests 
(p. 238), concluding that demand effects were not a concern for their study.  
 
2 It is worth clarifying here that social desirability bias and demand effects are separate risks to experimental validity. 
Social desirability bias is to answer surveys in a way that is viewed favorably by others, while demand effects represent 




Researchers could also proactively use designs that are more robust, although not immune, 
to demand effects, such as between-subjects designs rather than within-subject designs (de Quidt, 
Vesterlund, & Wilson, 2019). Researchers should make this choice only after carefully considering 
the trade-offs in these methods with regards to the context of the research question being studied 
and in light of the practical implementation of the research study (Charness, Gneezy, & Kuhn, 
2012). Other approaches are well covered in econometric textbooks covering experimental designs 
(see de Quidt et al., 2019) and include double-blind experiments, identical and neutral instructions 
across experimental manipulations, minimizing experimenter-participant interaction, not 
informing participants regarding study hypotheses, specific conditions, and expected outcomes, 
and efforts to mask researcher intent. Most of these remedies are relatively low-cost and, while 
they do not guarantee complete immunity from demand effects, they do reduce these risks and 
should be used whenever possible. Effectively managing demand effects through research design 
is a good example of how to off-set potential trade-offs in conducting rigorous and relevant 
experimental research.  
2.2. Critical considerations regarding the use of incentives 
Another key consideration in experimental design involves if and how participants are to 
be financially rewarded for their participation. Lonati et al. (2018) address the use of incentives in 
their fourth “commandment”, recommending that researchers “avoid hypothetical experiments 
with hypothetical choices” (p. 20). The situation is more nuanced, however, as it is critical to align 
the research question, the research context, and experimental incentives. For some research 
questions, decision-based financial incentives are appropriate. For example, Liu, Mak, and 
Rapoport (2015) examined whether participants chose shared transportation with shared costs or 




coincide with targeted behaviors, and so are clearly an appropriate design choice. However, for 
other research questions, decision-based incentives are inappropriate, and their introduction could 
create a confound. For example, Ried et al. (forthcoming) explored information leakages in buyer-
supplier-supplier triads, and how a supplier’s observation of a buyer leaking the information of an 
unrelated supplier causes the focal supplier to lose trust in that buyer and reduces wilingness to 
share information with the buyer. The research question, context, and absence of financial 
incentives are appropriately matched. Inappropriate introduction of decision-based incentives 
could lead participants to guess at the “right” answers to earn greater monetary rewards rather than 
simply answering honestly (Slater, 1980).  
In OM research, it is not atypical to encounter phenomena with no explicit extrinsic 
motivation, such as employees enacting organization-level decisions, where there is no expectation 
of direct, explicitly related rewards. For example, research investigating the decision to initiate a 
recall (Ball, Shah, & Donohue, 2018) does not depend on behavioral incentives because incentives 
are unrelated to the research question or the context in which the question is embedded. There are 
also good examples of mixed-method approaches. Cantor and Jin (2019) examined how production 
line factors influence intrinsically motivated helping behaviors, and do not incorporate use of 
incentives in their main study. The absence of incentives in this instance represents an appropriate 
match of research question, context, and design choice. In post-hoc tests, Cantor and Jin (2019) 
introduced team- and individual-level performance incentives, and found that while individual 
incentives were not related to helping, team-based incentives were. Again, the research question 
(i.e., do incentives influence helping?) coincided with the design choice. 
Even in contexts in which incentives are appropriate, there is ample empirical evidence 




trivial ways. Not surprisingly, these effects depend on a number of factors: the nature of the task 
(Eckartz, Kirchkamp, & Schunk, 2012), the amount or type of incentive (Holt, 1986; Holt & Laury, 
2005), the value placed on incentives by participants (Ariely, Bracha, & Meier, 2009), as well as 
a host of additional framing issues. For example, incentive alignment fails to improve performance 
when participants are risk averse, yet risk averse participants improve their performance under 
flat-rate schemes (Cadsby, Song, & Tapon, 2016). There are also important cultural differences in 
responses to incentive framing (Lee, Ribbink, & Eckerd, 2018). Financial incentives can even be 
harmful to decision-making efforts. In Camerer and Hogarth’s (1999) evaluation of 74 studies 
comparing the use of incentives, they identified overlearning effects, overexertion effects, and self-
conscious behaviors (i.e., “choking”) as potentially adverse consequences of incentivization. 
Meloy, Russo, and Miller (2006) found that incentives can impact participants’ mood, leading to 
biased information processing and overconfidence. 
 Our point throughout this section is not to suggest that research should or should not use 
decision-based incentives. Rather, we illustrate that the use of financial incentives in experiments 
carries its own risks. Researchers and reviewers should carefully consider how incentives match 
the research question and the research context to maximize the internal validity of the experiment.  
2.3. Deception should be used carefully and sparingly in experimental research 
A fast reading of Lonati et al.’s (2018) sixth commandment (“VI. Deception. Do not 
deceive participants; obfuscation is allowed.”, Table 1, p. 20) can lead a reader to understand a 
universal requirement for perfect truth in the administration of behavioral experiments. It is 
important to note that Lonati et al. (2018) are forgiving of obfuscation (i.e., the withholding of 
critical information), as well as a “reasonable amount of deception” applied in field experiments 




use of deception in experiment research is not a new one, with many point – counterpoint 
arguments available in the literature (e.g., Krasnow, 2020; Barrera and Simpson, 2012). Much of 
this debate is centered on how economists and social psychologists differ concerning what degree 
of deception is considered acceptable and what constitutes an appropriate exception. The debate 
illustrates that the degree of deception can be described on a continuum. For example, consider 
the use of a computer confederate in an experimental setting. Should it be considered deception to 
instruct participants, “You will be playing with a partner” when the partner is a computer? 
Consider further if the instructions said, “You will be playing against another player in the room” 
when the computer player was locally hosted on the machine in the room. While most might agree 
that “an explicit misstatement of fact” (Nicks, Korn, & Mainieri, 1997) qualifies as deception, a 
recent survey of experimental economists found there is considerable variability as to what 
constitutes deception and obfuscation (Samek, 2019). Thus, the problem is more difficult than 
asking when one can – or must – use deception; fundamentally, the concept is too ill-defined to 
answer such a query. Clearly, it is inconsistent with a scientific approach to draw an arbitrary line 
on deception; researchers need to carefully consider the benefits and risks of operating anywhere 
along the continuum.  
A key issue regarding deception is its potential to generate confounding effects, i.e. that 
the act of deceiving a participant will cause the participant to alter their behavior. To date, while 
there are very few empirical evaluations of the methodological costs of deception, there are a few 
from which we can draw some conclusions. Ortmann and Hertwig (2002; Hertwig & Ortmann, 
2008a; 2008b) conducted several evaluations across psychology studies using deception. They 
reported that when participants have direct and specific knowledge that deception was used, this 




not affected. Another set of studies (also reported on by Hertwig & Ortmann, 2008a) finds mixed 
results regarding whether deceived participants experience resentment (ascertained after 
debriefing), but that telling participants they will be deceived beforehand can alter performance, 
and that deception that arouses suspicion in participants may reduce conformity behaviors. The 
take-aways are that researchers using deception would be wise to wait until all data for the research 
effort has been conducted before debriefing participants, and that it may be worthwhile to post-
test participants for suspicion.   
A second issue concerns the use of repeated participant pools, as is the case with many 
undergraduate student laboratories. The potential risk posed is that a participant, once deceived in 
a study, will in the future be more suspicious of experiments, and that ambient distrust will lead to 
confounding behavior. There is indeed some evidence that deception can lead to less willingness 
to participate in future studies, particularly when the participant is both deceived and receives 
smaller compensation (Jamison, Karlan, & Schechter, 2008). Note this affects recruiting efforts, 
not confound effects. Yet, for labs using repeat sampling pools it is a risk worth considering. 
Jamison et al. (2008) suggested that, rather than banning deception altogether, participant pools 
could be maintained separately. Avoidance of deception may most profitably be thought of as a 
lab rule, as opposed to a research rule. 
A third issue involves the ethical considerations underlying deception and obfuscation. We 
would like to add to the discussion the role of review boards. Researchers in the U.S. must have 
their research designs vetted by Institutional Review Boards, all of which have special sections 
dedicated to the issues of deception or withholding of information. Similar Ethical Review Boards 
exist in many research universities in Europe, as well. These guidelines and gatekeepers help to 




breadth and applicability to issues of deception and obfuscation could be beneficial for the OM 
community.   
Use of deception requires an evaluation of trade-offs and consideration of the research 
question. For some research questions, deception works in opposition to the goals of the 
experiment, thus detracting from internal validity. For other research questions, the trade-off 
involves the ability to model important contextual cues in a controlled way, versus not representing 
those factors in the experiment at all (Ariely & Norton, 2007). For example, in studies of unethical 
behavior, confederates may be used to provide an initial modeling of the unethical behavior 
observed by participants so that ensuing contagion effects can be assessed (e.g., Gino, Gu, & 
Zhong, 2009). Although few experiments using deception have been conducted in OM (Lonati et 
al., 2018), those that do tend also to make use of confederates in order to control the treatments 
participants are exposed to or to provide important contextual knowledge (e.g., Eckerd et al., 2013; 
Sommer et al., 2020 and described in Section 3 below). Per Jamison et al. (2008), researchers 
should carefully consider its role, and use deception or information withholding only when the 
research is not otherwise practicable, risks are minimal, and potential benefits outweigh potential 
risks; as a reviewer, consider the trade-offs presented.  
2.4. Issues in experimental sampling 
Two issues often are relevant when it comes to experiment samples: sample size and the 
sample population. The issue of sample size is addressed by Lonati et al. (2018) in their eighth 
“commandment”; the advice provided in the table itself is that to “ensure an appropriate sample 
size per experimental cell for covariate balance (n > 50 per cell)” (p. 20). One must reference the 
footnote for the caveat that advanced planning of an experimental study should, if possible, include 




established advice (Verma & Goodale, 1995), and would add to it that it is important to clearly 
differentiate between the number of participants versus the number of observations. Often in 
experiment research, multiple observations are collected from a single participant (see the streams 
of literature evaluating the bullwhip effect and newsvendor decision-making, as examples). Where 
this experimental design is used, it is the number of independent observations that typically 
matters. For a more in-depth review of sample size considerations, we refer readers to Lenth 
(2001), who pointed out additional practical and ethical concerns relating to sample size, beyond 
statistical considerations.  
The issue of sample population tends to be a trickier concern in our field. Laboratory-based 
studies often use students as participants. This is advocated for in Lonati et al. (2018) in their ninth 
“commandment”, and we agree that students are convenient participants because it is easy to get 
them into university labs, and they are relatively cost-effective participants. However, 
theoretically, an argument needs to be made for the appropriateness of a sample, which means 
matching the sample to the focal research question (Thomas, 2011). For research evaluating 
universalistic theories, student research participants are generally “safe” (Stevens, 2011). 
However, even when the arguments for using students are sound, it should still be acknowledged 
in all studies employing student samples that their use represents a convenience sample, and the 
convenience of student samples comes at a cost. Research has described student participant pools 
as “WEIRD”, meaning from cultures that are Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and 
democratic (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010a; 2010b). These restrictions can be quite 
meaningful when interpreting problems in the context of OM, where focal research questions orbit 
global problems. We are not suggesting this de-legitimizes the use of student participant pools, 




use. One effective mechanism to help reduce the concerns regarding the bias of a specific sample 
is to replicate the results using additional samples that are drawn from a different pool (McGrath, 
1982). Replication of results across samples strengthens the triangulation and robustness of any 
research.  
Increasingly, studies in the OM space are adopting online platforms (e.g., Amazon 
Mechanical Turk [MTurk], Qualtrics panels) to administer experiments (see Lee, Seo, & Siemsen, 
2018). These online platforms greatly expand potential participant pools, but also are subject to 
trade-offs (Aguinis & Lawal, 2012; 2013). A key initial issue is whether the sample is appropriate 
for the research question; for example, online panels can be particularly useful when there are 
confidentiality concerns, such as when asking about abusive supervision (Porter, Outlaw, Gale, & 
Cho, 2019) or supply chain fraud (DuHadway, Talluri, Ho, & Buckoff, 2020). A thorough 
exposition of the strengths and weaknesses of crowdsourcing platforms is offered by Goodman 
and Paolacci (2017). Among the strengths are reduced costs, participant diversity, and a well-
referenced section purporting the strong data quality achieved through MTurk. Hauser and 
colleagues (2018) provided evidence and solutions for some of the more common concerns relating 
to the use of MTurk samples, including insufficient effort, language comprehension issues, and 
misrepresentativeness. While some studies have reported increased attentiveness of MTurk 
samples as compared to student samples (Klein et al., 2014; Hauser & Schwarz, 2016), the use of 
attention checks with any sample is an important experimental protocol (Abbey & Meloy, 2017; 
Kane & Barabas, 2019). Finally, it is possible through certain online platforms (e.g., MTurk) to 
build a personal panel of participants who can be properly screened and tracked over time (Peer, 
Paolacci, Chandler, & Mueller, 2012; Litman, Robinson, & Abberbock, 2017; Sharpe Wessling, 




While much of this guidance is specific to MTurk, by and large the lessons conveyed are 
applicable to many of the other commonly used platforms (Google Surveys, Prolific, etc.). 
Importantly, the concerns regarding online participant pools are not unique to OM. The guidance 
here originates from a variety of disciplines, in particular management and marketing, which have 
learned to successfully navigate this potentially rich resource.  
2.5. Vignette (and other non-consequential) studies 
Behavioral OM has tended to maintain a focus on actual behaviors, or “in-task” behaviors 
(Bachrach & Bendoly, 2011; Croson et al., 2013). However, while actions represent one plausible 
dependent variable, intentions, attitudes, and affect also are important outcomes amenable to 
experimental study. These “out-of-task” perceptual measurements often are the underlying drivers 
of observed behaviors (Ajzen, 1991; Gino & Pisano, 2008), and can be evaluated using vignette 
study designs (or non-consequential decision making, in Lonati et al., 2018, and addressed in their 
fourth “commandment”). Ultimately, the appropriateness of such design decisions comes down to 
the purpose of the research; for research intended to develop theory, it is reasonable to use “more 
artificial, stylized scenarios”, but where the research purpose involves testing theory to better 
understand real behavior, then enhanced realism undeniably aids in that effort (Morales, Amir, & 
Lee, 2017, p. 474). A quick perusal of Lonati et al. (2018) may leave the reader with the impression 
that they advocate a categorical ban on vignette studies; while the authors do offer some nuance 
on the topic, given the increasing prevalence of vignette studies in OM and the value they stand to 
offer, we find it useful to expand on this discussion. As with any other research method, there are 
best practices to be adhered to when conducting a vignette study (see Weber, 1992; 




Correctly designed vignette experiments situate participants in an operational scenario, or 
a storyline, that is carefully crafted to realistically depict the problem setting. The vignette consists 
of baseline information about the setting that is consistent across all treatments (a common 
module), and manipulations of the independent variable conveyed by different versions of the 
scenario (experimental cues modules) that are randomly distributed to participants by treatment 
(Rungtusanatham et al., 2011).3 Vignette studies have a strong history of use in other disciplines, 
where they are used for their ability to balance the challenges regarding internal versus external 
validity (Aguinis & Bradley, 2014). Benefits of vignette studies are that they overcome weak 
external validity of traditional experiments, cover a broad range of relevant factors, and increase 
“the generalizability of context specific results” (Atzmüller & Steiner, 2010, p. 137). 
Despite these benefits, there are also trade-offs to consider. First, while one benefit is in 
introduction of context comparable to what one might experience in “real life”, there may be 
situations in which the context is too dense or broad in scope for a vignette study to adequately 
capture (Lohrke, Holloway, & Woolley, 2010). A vignette needs to contain the information 
essential to understanding the context, or it may lead to a situation where the participant projects 
their own experiences or knowledge to fill in the gaps (Wason, Polonsky, & Hyman, 2002). A 
second challenge involves the effective manipulation of variables. Manipulations must be salient 
to the participant, yet in their exposition it is important to protect against framing effects (Wason 
et al., 2002). Different treatments should be as similar as possible, to avoid potential confounds in 
the experiment (Rungtusanatham et al., 2011).  
 
3 An example vignette from Joshi and Arnold (1997) is provided in Appendix A to clearly show baseline and 
experimental cue modules. Although having originated in marketing, this baseline scenario and context has been 




In some fields, such as marketing, there is a current and concerted effort to improve the 
realism of vignette studies where it is a fit to the research question (Morales et al., 2017). Efforts 
to enhance realism can be particularly useful when testing theory, for example, but may be less 
pertinent when research is developing new theory (Morales et al., 2017). Mechanisms for 
increasing realism can involve the use of video or audio clips in vignette studies, as briefly pointed 
to in Lonati et al. (2018). These techniques can help increase participant engagement (Caro et al., 
2012) and the ecological validity of vignette studies (Bateson & Hui, 1992). For example, 
Victorino, Verma, and Wardell (2013) enhanced the realism of the scenarios used in their OM 
research examining service scripting by creating videos of service encounters (see also Seawright 
& Sampson, 2007, for an example of a video vignette methodology applied to waiting lines). 
Technological advancements are even facilitating the use of virtual reality studies for full-
immersion, multi-sensory experiences (Aguinis & Edwards, 2014). Another design approach for 
enhancing participants’ engagement involves opportunities to seek out or probe for additional 
information, such as conducting internet searches (Caro et al., 2012). Yet, even these design 
choices are not free of trade-offs; as studies become more immersive, there are more opportunities 
for confounding effects, increased costs, and logistical challenges. Victorino and Dixon (2016) 
provide excellent methodological guidance for the development of video experiments. 
 As Croson and colleagues (2013, p. 4) pointed out: “Using [out-of-task psychometric 
measures] as correlates in the context of experiments or surveys is a technique that will enrich the 
field of behavioral operations”. There is much to be learned from studies more deeply exploring 
the processes of judgement and decision-making, and one of the prominent techniques for doing 
so is through vignette experiments. Through the guidance offered in this section, we hope to 




3. Contributions of OM research from multiple perspectives  
While in Section 2 we focused on each discussion point (demand effects, incentive 
alignment, deception, sample issues, and context-rich vignette experiments) independent of one 
another, it is also useful to think about how trade-offs occur across designs. Because OM is an 
applied field, our research questions tend to depend heavily on context, which implies that 
participants in experiments may need to have work experience. It makes little sense to incentivize 
managers with money, as the quantities are generally not sufficiently motivating to get them to 
leave work and travel to a lab. Such participants are more likely to be motivated with access to 
study results through a white paper. They may also be willing to invest in the experiment even if 
they perceive it as non-consequential if they are convinced that it will result in the generation of 
useful knowledge. Vignette studies may thus yield important insights in the OM context even in 
the absence of perfectly aligned incentives. 
As a further, more detailed example of how these research design considerations trade off 
in practice, we consider two experiments in our field that on the surface appear to be highly related, 
yet rely on fundamentally different design choices to explore their research question. Each of the 
following experiments explore individuals’ perceptions of value for products. However, a more 
detailed exploration of these experiments shows that they rely on different foundations in their 
analysis to appropriately match their research design to their research question.  
Agrawal, Atasu, and van Ittersum (2015) investigated the typical customer’s perceived 
value of original manufactured goods when refurbished versions are available from either the 
original manufacturer or a third party. The research context is a purchasing decision where a 
general consumer pays for the product. Agrawal et al. (2015) matched the context to the research 




respondent $1 and a chance to receive a decision-based incentive of $200 based on their specific 
choices in the experiment. This is an appropriate research sample, as their question focuses on 
general population purchasing behaviors, and MTurk is shown to be reasonably representative of 
the general population (Goodman, Cryder, & Cheema, 2013). Had they used a more targeted 
sample (e.g., CEOs or students), their findings would be weaker due to decreased generalizability.  
The Agrawal et al. (2015) experiment presents limited context, describing primarily the 
choice between two products. Again, this is the correct approach because the research question is 
not highly dependent on the context and the choice is easy for participants to understand. Adding 
additional superfluous details in the experiment would detract from the strength of their 
manipulation. The use of a decision-based incentive is correctly matched in the experiment to the 
incentives in reality, where consumers benefit directly from purchases in the form of the goods 
they select. Had they selected a flat-rate incentive for participation, the findings would be weaker. 
The authors’ selection of sample, context, incentive, and overall experimental design is clearly 
based on their research question of interest: selecting a general consumer sample, matching a 
simplified consumer purchasing environment, using incentives since they are connected to the 
research question of valuations, and using conjoint analysis with limited context outside of the 
choices presented.  
Bendoly and Cotteleer (2008) investigated managerial perceptions of value for different 
characteristics of enterprise resource planning systems. The research context is a manager’s 
purchasing decision where a firm pays for the product. Bendoly and Cotteleer (2008) matched the 
context of the research question by using a targeted sample of managers asked to review written 
cases, and then to provide their own evaluations of the relative usefulness of communication 




correct research sample, because the population of interest is highly focused. Had Bendoly and 
Cotteleer (2008) instead used student participants or a general MTurk sample, unfamiliar with the 
real-world complexity related to the task, their results would be weaker. Specifically, the sampling 
strategy/population of interest increases the generalizability of their results. Incentives are not 
discussed, as they are not relevant for the choice. Unlike the consumer’s purchasing decision, 
managers typically do not receive pay – or receive direct incentives for – for these types of 
organizational purchases; any such rewards are typically indirect. If Bendoly and Cotteleer (2008) 
had used decision-based incentives, it would have weakened their findings as connecting 
incentives to the outcome variables would likely increase demand effects by leading the 
participants to simply guess what answers would generate greater rewards (for example, choosing 
the most/least expensive without consideration for their organizational needs).  
Despite superficially similar research questions, these efforts require different approaches 
regarding sample selection, use of hypothetical scenarios, depth of context provided, and decision-
based incentives. If the authors had applied different design choices, then their experiments would 
decrease in both rigor and relevance. For example, if Bendoly and Cotteleer (2008) had used a 
generalized online sample or students as opposed to managers, abandoned the rich context of a 
case study in favor of simple context-free choices, or rewarded participants financial compensation 
based on the decisions they made, both the internal and external validity of the research, and thus 
its potential contribution, would be substantially lessened. Similarly, had Agrawal et al. (2015) 
used a narrow target population rather than a general sample, added the irrelevant context of a case 
study, or did not provide decision-based incentives these choices would have diminished the value 
of their work. Table 2 compares how these two experiments make research design decisions based 




Table 2: Effective Use of Research Design Decisions 
  Agrawal et al. (2015) Bendoly and Cotteleer (2008) 
Research 
Question 
How do consumers value product 
characteristics for personal purchases? 
How do managers value product 
characteristics in organizational 
purchases? 
Incentives Decision-based incentive, matching the personal purchase scenario 
No decision-based incentive, matching 
the organizational purchase scenario 
Context 
Limited context is presented to focus on 
the primary choice of refurbished 
products 
Detailed context is provided to ground 
the experiment in reality 
Sample MTurk, representative of the general population 
Managers, representative of the focused 
target population 
Deception 
No deception was applied; it was not 
necessary to suggest to participants 
details that were not valid in the context 
of the experiment 
No deception was applied; it was not 
necessary to suggest to participants 
details that were not valid in the context 
of the experiment 
 
Other well-designed research experiments might take a combination of multiple research 
designs and methods. For example, Sommer, Bendoly, and Kavadias (2019) investigated how 
individuals and teams explore complex problems. The approach is inherently multi-disciplinary as 
it employed a combination of normative modeling and experiments, and used a variety of research 
design choices bridging both aspects of the key issues identified in Table 1 and Table 2. The 
research context was intentionally simple, as the research question was on the search process, not 
the actual decisions being made. To enhance the realism of the search process, the authors provided 
live feedback from a market analyst. Rather than being an individual providing feedback as it is 
presented in the simulation, the feedback was done using artificial intelligence (i.e., a confederate) 
that provided market analysis based on actual experimental performance and decisions made. This 
design choice was well justified in the research article. Even though the experimental task was a 
highly simplified context, the authors also incorporated the use of vignettes as part of the pre-




given that for the research context, “students are expected to be fairly homogeneous with respect 
to task-specific competencies and knowledge” (Sommer et al., 2019, p. 10). The ability to make 
research design choices across the multiple epistemological backgrounds of operations research 
enhances experimental validity.   
4. Conclusions  
 The OM field draws on multiple foundations, and those foundations do not always agree 
on methodological “best practices.” Lonati et al. (2018) started an important discussion in our field 
by provocatively presenting a set of “ten commandments” for experimental research (Table 1, p. 
20). While the Lonati et al. (2018) piece provides experimental guidance fitting to certain research 
agendas, questions have arisen concerning whether and how exactly to implement some of the 
points that it makes, and how to best address trade-offs in the design of behavioral experiments. 
Questions have also arisen concerning how to apply these concepts in operations management 
(OM). In this note, we have elaborated on the design choices surrounding demand effects, 
incentives, deception, sample issues, and the use of vignettes. We have carefully depicted the trade-
offs inherent in making design decisions in experimental research. Consistent with the long-
standing perspective of McGrath (1982), there is no single “best” method; we agree that it is very 
difficult to lay down a set of guidelines that fairly and adequately addresses different research 
foundations. We suggest that the path forward is an acknowledgement and appreciation of these 
differences. As eloquently stated by Croson (2005, p. 145) “Each researcher needs to make their 
own methodological decisions based on the objectives of the experiment, the methods currently 
used in their field, and the audience they wish to address.” We can all likely agree that OM is a 
cross-disciplinary field; we build on the foundations of other disciplines to inform our own work 




rigorous research requires that we as a community invest together to explore and understand the 
nuances so that we can produce actionable research efficiently, and so that we can provide 
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The following vignette is reproduced from Joshi and Arnold (1997). The headings are not visible 
to the participant. We added the notations in brackets differentiating baseline modules and 
experimental cues modules. The vignette begins and concludes with baseline (i.e., common) 
modules. Each participant randomly received one of the two dependence experimental cues 
modules (low or high), and one of the two relational norms experimental cues modules (low or 
high). 
Introduction [Baseline Module] 
You are a purchasing manager responsible for the purchase of microchips for a midsize electronic 
equipment manufacturer. Microchips are an important component for the equipment that you 
manufacture; therefore, they need to be purchased on a regular basis. You have one existing 
supplier for this component.  
Low Dependence [Experimental Cues Module] 
As purchasing manager responsible for microchips, you find yourself in a situation wherein it is 
not difficult for you to find a suitable replacement for the existing supplier. If you decide to stop 
purchasing from this supplier, you could easily replace their volume with purchases from 
alternative suppliers. There are many competitive suppliers for microchips and you can switch to 
them without incurring any search costs. Switching suppliers is not going to have any negative ef- 
fects on the quality or design of the equipment that you manufacture. Your production system can 
be easily adapted to use components from a new supplier. The procedures and routines that you 
have developed are standard and they are equally applicable with any supplier of this component. 
The skills that your people have acquired in the process of working with the supplier can easily be 
changed to fit another supplier’s situation. You can therefore terminate your relationship with your 
present supplier without incurring any costs.  
High Dependence [Experimental Cues Module] 
As purchasing manager responsible for microchips, you find yourself in a situation wherein it is 
difficult for you to find a suitable replacement for the existing supplier. If you decide to stop 
purchasing from this supplier, you could not easily replace their volume with purchases from 
alternative suppliers. There are very few, if any, competitive suppliers for microchips and you 
cannot switch to them without incurring significant search and verification costs. Switching 
suppliers is also going to have negative effects on the quality or design of the equipment that you 
manufacture. Your production system cannot be easily adapted to use components from a new 
supplier. The procedures and routines that you have developed are unique and hence they are not 
applicable with any other supplier of this component. The skills that your people have acquired in 
the process of working with the supplier cannot easily be changed to fit another supplier’s situation. 
You cannot therefore terminate your relationship with your present supplier without incurring 





Low Relational Norms [Experimental Cues Module] 
Both you and your supplier bring a formal and contract-governed orientation to this relationship. 
Exchange of information in this relation- ship takes place infrequently, formally, and in accordance 
to the terms of a prespecified agreement. Even if you do know of an event or change that might 
affect the other party, you do not divulge this information to them. Strict adherence to the terms of 
the original agreement characterizes your relationship with this supplier. Even in the face of unex- 
pected situations, rather than modifying the contract, you adhere to the original terms. You have 
an arm’s-length relationship with your supplier. You do not think that the supplier is committed to 
your organization—in fact, you think that if you did not carefully monitor this supplier’s 
performance, they would slack off from the original terms. Above all, you see your supplier as an 
external economic agent with whom you have to bargain in order to get the best deal for yourself.  
High Relational Norms [Experimental Cues Module] 
Both you and your supplier bring an open and frank orientation to the relationship. Exchange of 
information in this relationship takes place frequently, informally, and not always according to a 
prespecified agreement. You keep each other informed of any event or change that might affect 
the other party. Flexibility is a key characteristic of this relationship. Both sides make ongoing 
adjustments to cope with the changing circumstances. When some unexpected situation arises, the 
parties would rather work out a new deal than hold each other responsible to the original terms. 
You tend to help each other out in case of unexpected crises. If your supplier is unable to fulfill an 
order, they recommend an alternative source of supply for the same. Above all, you have a sense 
that your supplier is committed to your organization and that they work with you keeping your 
best interests in mind. You see each other as partners, not rivals.  
Conclusion [Baseline Module] 
Recently, the supplier informed you that they are involved in a labor dispute. Consequently, they 
are temporarily unable to guarantee on-schedule delivery. This creates some uncertainty for your 
organization. Delayed delivery of microchips, may, for example, cause problems for your 
organization in meeting delivery schedules to customers. The supplier has called to get your 
regular order. Drawing from experience, how would you be most likely to react in this situation? 
Please rate each of these statements to the extent that they match with your expectation of your 
reaction.  
 
